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Abstract Policymakers across myriad jurisdictions are grappling with the challenge of 
complex policy problems.  Multi-faceted, complex, and seemingly intractable, ‘wicked’ 
problems have exhausted the repertoire of the standard policy approaches.  In response, 
governments are increasingly looking for new options, and one approach that has gained 
significant scholarly interest, along with increasing attention from practitioners, is ‘place-
based’ solutions.  This paper surveys conceptual aspects of this approach. It describes 
practices in comparable jurisdictions – the UK, the EU and the US. And it explores efforts 
over the past decade to ‘localise’ Indigenous services. It sketches the governance challenge in 
migrating from top-down or principal-agent arrangements towards place-based practice. The 
paper concludes that many of the building blocks for this shift already exist but that these 
need to be re-oriented around ‘learning’. Funding and other administrative protocols may also 
ultimately need to be redefined.  
 
Introduction  
Policymakers across myriad jurisdictions are grappling with the challenge of complex policy 
problems.  Multi-faceted, complex, and seemingly insoluble, ‘wicked’ problems have 
exhausted the repertoire of the standard systemic policy approaches traditionally available to 
governments.  Such problems are now widely recognised, in Rittel and Webber’s (1973) 
terms, as interconnected, malignant and aggressive, unable to be easily managed let alone 
resolved, and requiring innovative governance changes across multiple dimensions (APSC 
2007). In response, governments are increasingly looking for new options, and one approach 
that has gained significant scholarly interest, along with increasing attention from 
practitioners, is ‘place-based’ solutions.  Place-based approaches seek to break down the 
‘wickedness’ of broad and complex problems – like poverty for example – by dealing in 
detail with its different manifestations in different places at a very fine-grained local level. 
There are considerable governance challenges around deploying place-based approaches 
(Wilks et al 2015) not least of which are those associated with greater connectivity in joined-
up service delivery (O’Flynn et al 2011). 
This paper reflects on the international application of place-based practice to assess its 
potential to meet policy challenges in Australian settings.  We focus on three research 
questions: 
 1. What are the necessary conditions for establishing a governance regime that can 
support contextualised place-based solutions while maintaining accountability?  
2. How have place-based approaches been conceptualised in other jurisdictions, and 
how effective are they? 
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3. Can regimes based on centrally determined targets and top-down performance 
management migrate to more cost-effective, place-based practice?   
We argue that place-based approaches will only work if the organisations delivering services 
– be they public or private – are structured in ways that respond to local need and allow staff 
to exercise discretion in responding to specific cases on the ground. At one-and-the-same 
time, place-based approaches need to be holistic in assessing local need in its full context, 
whilst being fine-grained enough to respond to those needs in flexible and individually 
tailored ways.  This needs to be coupled with new thinking on how best to combine requisite 
levels of accountability with high levels of decentralisation.  
The paper proceeds as follows: first, it surveys conceptual foundations, focussing in 
particular on the groundbreaking work of Charles Sabel and his co-authors. The second 
section surveys some place-based responses in comparable jurisdictions – the UK, the EU 
and the US. We then move to an in-depth analysis of how aspects of place-based governance 
have underpinned efforts to ‘localise’ Indigenous services in Australia. A concluding section 
summarises the argument in the wider context of reflections on the need for a renewal of 
administrative practice.  
Conceptualising place-based services  
‘Place’ has increasingly been proposed as an alternative approach in service delivery to top-
down (or centralised or principal-agent based) governance (see for example Wilks et al 2015; 
Keller et al 2015; and Moore et al 2014). There would seem to be at least two basic reasons. 
First, governments are obliged to address chronic or emergent social problems to which there 
are no textbook remedies. And second, fiscal pressures are an increasing imperative (but see 
Hood and Dixon (2013). These factors are mutually reinforcing and it is becoming 
increasingly apparent that wicked issues, such as unemployment, obesity, and drug 
dependence, for example, require bespoke approaches and engagement with the concerned 
citizen(s)/communities.  
From a fiscal perspective, constrained revenues also encourage a focus on high cost 
services in the search for savings. But a focus on high cost services can require a more fine-
grained assessment than is available in siloed budgets. This was graphically illustrated in the 
British Total Place report (HMT/DOC 2010), which emphasised the highly variable cost to 
the state of families with different circumstances and/or levels of need (OPM 2009). Not only 
did expenditure accrue highly unevenly across different categories of families but also most 
was reactive. By joining up services and responding proactively, ‘place’ promises to achieve 
more cost-effective outcomes. 
One such scholar who has sought to add theoretical and conceptual depth to an 
understanding of place-based approaches is Charles (Chuck) Sabel.  Working with co-authors, 
such as William Simon, Sabel has argued that there is a set of necessary conditions that 
underpin successful place-based governance. Sabel and Simon’s place-based architecture 
includes four elements: framework goals; broad local discretion; regular, local reporting and 
peer review, and therefore mutual local learning facilitated by ‘the centre’; and the evaluation 
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and revision of goals, performance measures and decision-making procedures (Simon and 
Sabel 2011, pp. 79-81).  Each of these four components operates in a mutually interlinked 
way, meaning they operate dynamically rather than as a sequential checklist.  Framework 
goals are about identifying broad and shared visions of what is trying to be achieved, such as 
the eradication of poverty in a locality.  Broad discretion means placing both trust and 
responsibility in the people on the ground, be they public servants or partner organisations.  
The reporting requirement is crucial – not as a tick-box-exercise in measuring easily 
quantified outputs, but rather envisaged as a conversation where review leads to continual 
improvement.  The evaluation and performance measurement is in some ways an 
acknowledgement that governments need ways in which to be able to objectively state that 
something is a success or not, and to hold someone accountable for the outcomes. 
The essence of a localised approach is the accountability of communities or production 
agents not just for outcomes but also for the means that they adopt to achieve them. In Sabel 
and Simon’s schema, agents need to indicate how they will approach their task and how they 
will self-assess. They need to be willing to share information about their practices such as 
planning and monitoring processes, delivery processes and governance processes. They must 
focus on progressively developing more effective outcomes, and their learning and 
continuous improvement must be facilitated.  
The many challenges that place-based practice presents to more traditional, 
centralised approaches include an acceptance that in the development of policy learning, the 
primary building block is the means used by different providers who are working towards 
broadly similar ends. There is therefore no ‘best practice’ service delivery because most 
service settings will be too localised and contextualised to allow codified or standardised 
service designs to be developed. Following Sabel and Simon, we propose that place-based 
practice must satisfy three not immediately compatible criteria:  
Localised context – first, since the development of agency or capacity at individual, 
family and/or community level is the goal, service designs must allow responses to be 
contextualised to ‘local’ individual needs and/or community circumstances.   
Embedded learning – second, design must embed learning as the core value of the 
system and as the dynamic heart of its administrative architecture – to yield granular 
information that is essential to realise continuous improvement and reciprocal learning. 
Moreover, learning is pragmatic and experiential and adaptive not codified or definitive:  
Reciprocal accountability – third, because public funds and politically determined 
purposes are involved, central accountability is essential. But accountability should entail a 
justification of local results against local targets set in the context of priorities or themes 
determined by the centre. Adaptive learning is gained from sharing outcomes across sites. 
 Sabel and Simon’s identification of the elements underpinning place-based practice 
has highlighted the implicit tension between top-down and decentralised service designs. 
Established architectures, built in the era of New Public Management (NPM) emphasised 
central determination of outcomes, accountability based on these goals and service delivery 
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based on arms length contracts. But place-based action implies variability of outcomes across 
sites, their progressive development, discretion for on-the-ground staff to tailor approaches to 
local circumstances, and individual/community engagement in decisions that affect them.  
This is a significant shift in service design and administrative practice and can be 
conceptualised, we argue, as a shift from a pattern of delivery based on centrally determined 
economies of scale to one based on decentralised economies of scope. Key differences are 
depicted in Table 1 below.  
Economies of scale – centre-based Economies of scope – place-based 
- principal-agent approach - pragmatic, learn by doing approach 
- silo-based policy design and organisation - distributed policy design and organisation 
- requires the establishment of central targets, 
elaborate performance measurement systems, 
top-down accountability and compliance 
regimes; and often involves service delivery by 
arms-length contracts 
- requires the establishment of appropriate local 
organisation, appropriate local collaboration, and 
appropriate capacities for planning and 
implementation 
- maximises efficiencies around discrete or 
segmented tasks 
- maximises opportunities for proactive attention 
to complex, variable and high cost service 
challenges 
- mobilises resources around centrally 
determined programmes (education, 
employment, child welfare, prisons etc.) 
- mobilise resources around contexts, individuals 
or client categories 
- focus on pre-determined and segmented needs - focus on a holistic or comprehensive response 
to need 
- knowledge principally derives from specialised 
theory 
- assumes that knowledge about need is 
generated in the local context and often involves 
ad hoc teams 
- predisposed to one-size-fits-all or best practice 
service models 
- facilitates continuous, adaptive learning 
- looks to randomised trials based on one 
possible meld 
- looks for continuous improvement 
- centrally determined targets and metrics - provisional and corrigible targets and purposes 
- prioritises prescriptive regulation and/or arms-
length, price-based contracts without provision 
for shared learning. 
- prioritises accountable self-assessment and 
price based arrangements that enable shared 
learning and continuous improvement. 
Table 1 - The service delivery design challenge: from centre to place 
 
In the next section, we examine some recent developments in comparable jurisdictions to 
analyse the extent to which a shift away from economies of scale and towards economies of 
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scope has been reflected in practice.  In particular, we examine the interactions between the 
three criteria of localised context, embedded learning, and reciprocal accountability to 
identify the friction points. 
 
Place-based Approaches in Comparable Jurisdictions  
UK Community Budgets  
Recent UK governments have all sought to implement more decentralised governance, but 
through a variety of different prisms.  Under the Blair/Brown Labour governments, Local 
Area Agreements (LAA’s) were implemented to devolve some responsibilities to individual 
local councils, with varied results (see NAO 2007).  The Lyons (2007) review of local 
government drew attention to place-based approaches, sparking a flourishing conversation on 
the merits of place-based thinking, with think tanks important contributors to the emerging 
agenda (Wind-Cowie 2010; IPPR 2010; Paun et al 2010; Coote 2010). The House of 
Commons Public Administration Select Committee (2007; 2012; 2013), and the UK’s 
Communities and Local Government Committee (DCLG 2015b) have also played important 
roles in reviewing aspects of the various place-based approaches that have been implemented. 
The first Cameron government embraced aspects of a decentralising agenda, 
including the Troubled Families program, aimed at joining up services at a local level to 
holistically address schooling, crime and employment challenges faced by individual families 
(see DCLG 2015a).  The 2011 Whole Place Community Budgets program emphasised a 
wider shift in service design from central to local authorities (PAC 2013). Relevant central 
and local departments and agencies (and where appropriate NGOs and the private sector) 
joined up to create proactive services more responsive to specific local or client 
circumstances and needs. The promise, and indeed the premise, is enhanced service delivery 
impact at less cost.  The Whole Place project was launched with four pilots that involved 
joint project teams from central government and the relevant authorities that mapped highest 
cost services/ categories and then sought to devise joined-up programmes. Technical advisory 
sub-groups focused on specific policy areas – health and adult social care; criminal justice; 
families with complex needs; the economy; and education and early years. They identified 
sources of information on unit costs and outcomes, and promoted consistency in assumptions 
(CSC 2011; LGA 2013; NAO 2013).  
The National Audit Office (2013) undertook an assessment of Whole-place community 
budgets and was broadly supportive of place-based, joined up initiatives. It also highlighted 
the need to develop more robust and more standardised measurement tools as the experience 
of place-based delivery accumulated. This has since occurred, covering aspects such as:  
• Information standardisation and sharing protocols;  
• A protocol concerning the sharing of savings; and 
• The maintenance and strengthening of incentives for participation in a program whose 
pay-offs are relatively long term.   
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The Whole Place program has since been extended to neighbourhoods under the Our Place 
label with substantial devolution to cities (HMT and Rt Hon George Osborne 2014; DCLG 
2015b). The government has also commissioned six independent bodies to constitute what it 
has termed What Works Institutes in the areas of: health and social care, education attainment, 
ageing better, local growth, crime reduction and effective early intervention. However full 
evaluation remains to be undertaken. No doubt partly at least driven by budget restraint, the 
program has since developed on a substantial scale and its purposes have widened . For 
example, there are now at least three decentralising programs – City Deals1, Local Enterprise 
Partnerships and Devolution Deals. By 2016, 27 City Deals and 39 Local Enterprise 
Partnerships had been established. In addition, ten Devolution Deals have been concluded 
(covering, for example, London, Greater Manchester, and Cornwall). A commitment to join-
up a number of local areas and to introduce an elected mayor are a prerequisite for entering 
this arrangement. 46% of the population of England will be covered by such arrangements by 
2017. As a consequence, central support for local government is planned to end by 2020. But 
a number of issues remain to be resolved, including importantly fiscal equalisation. 
	Whilst responsive to local context and needs, Whole Place appears driven by ‘best 
practice’ rather than by embedded, peer reviewed and shared learning at the place-based level. 
Reciprocal accountability is critical however it is unclear whether contractually based 
arrangements will constrain adaptation or ‘learning-by-doing’. An adaptive approach in this 
context requires a willingness to turn away from a focus on hierarchy and efficiency in favour 
of empowering decentralized decision-making in ways that will make an on-the ground 
difference (Roberts 1997).  This philosophy was driving the Cameron coalition government 
with its principles of ‘reform, devolution and efficiency’2, whilst lessons about learning at the 
level of local service delivery in the UK are now being generated (See Wilson et al 2016). In 
the next section we provide a brief scan of the ways in which other jurisdictions have sought 
to overcome centralised ‘best practice’ approaches in favour of more locally embedded 
options. 
 
Experimentalist or Pragmatist Approaches in the US and EU 
Alternatives to the UK’s Whole Place approach have emerged in federal and multi-level 
governance systems where there are concerns with designing complex yet relevant and cost 
effective solutions in problem areas of policy design. An experimental or pragmatist 
approach, indeed experimental pragmatism, has evolved in the US and EU as an alternative 
response (See Sabel 1992; 2004; and Sabel and Zeitlin 2011). This we equate with an 
emphasis upon the practical aspects of ‘learning by doing’ in policy design, and the role of 
local and shared knowledge as an instrument of discovery and adaptation.  In keeping with 
																																								 																				
1Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull intends to adapt City Deals as part of his new cities agenda (Dole 
2016). 
2 See - https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-minister-my-vision-for-a-smarter-state. NB Cameron 
has since stood down as PM following the result of the Brexit referendum; replaced by Theresa May. 
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place-based principles, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that defines experimental 
pragmatism, but rather a determination to fit responses to local conditions.  In the following 
paragraphs, we sketch out five brief examples that highlight the current breadth of 
international practice to illustrate the variety of options that an experimental place-based 
approach can encompass.  The list is by no means exhaustive, but provides an insight into the 
spectrum of approaches being adopted in other jurisdictions. 
1. School Support - special support is being provided for underperforming students in 
Finland and some US States, with teams (variously comprising professionals, family 
members etc.) that identify barriers to learning on a case-by-case basis. Such services are 
used by some 30 per cent of Finnish students (Sabel et al 2010). Control over education 
has devolved to the town council level in Finland, but in a national curriculum context 
that has seen remarkable transformation in terms of service delivery and student 
achievement (Hancock 2011). 
 
2. Child Welfare - services meet specific circumstances in a number of US states with the 
aim of combining individualised service with ‘explicitness and standardisation of 
explanation and measurement’ (Noonan et al. 2009 p. 535). Casework is a process of co-
ordination and collaboration amongst stakeholders (parents, caregivers and children), 
professionals and institutions. Its basis is an agreed written plan. Having to agree on a 
common formulation increases the chances that these plans will add value to each other’s 
specialised perspective. 
  
3. Private Sector Regulation - has been a third site for experimentalism (Sabel and Simon 
2011, pp. 83-89). Typically, this involves a rolling rule regime in which, rather than 
conforming to a pre-established, centralised prescriptive code, the regulated entity 
identifies the risks to which it believes it is exposed and how it proposes to eliminate 
them. A regulatory authority evaluates the merit of these plans by benchmarking them 
against the best performers as happens in the US in areas such as food safety, 
pharmaceuticals, nuclear power, and air safety.   
4. Intergovernmental Design – the German labour market program Perspective 50 Plus 
(Sabel et al forthcoming3) brought older recipients of income benefits back into (stable) 
employment through novel program design. A new program of regional employment 
pacts was launched, funded federally, but with targets and means determined at the 
municipal level in teams involving all the appropriate regional and local actors. A central 
Program Management Agency, run by an independent non-profit organization, reviewed 
and audited program proposals, advising both jobcentres and the ministry. 
 
																																								 																				
3 See also the OECD brief “Perspective 50 Plus” – Employment pacts for older workers in the regions Available 
at: http://www.oecd.org/employment/leed/37729545.pdf 
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5. Local control of healthcare – the Nuka system of care in Alaska has seen Alaska’s Native 
people take direct ownership and managerial control of their healthcare system through 
the non-profit Southcentral Foundation (Gottlieb 2013).  The system is built around the 
three pillars of ‘shared responsibility’, ‘commitment to quality’, and ‘family wellness’.  It 
covers all aspects of healthcare, including mental and physical health, behavioural 
approaches, and dental care, and focuses on relationship building between service 
providers and consumers. 
Having sketched out a variety of international developments (See also Sabel and Zeitlin 
2011), which each embrace aspects of localised context, embedded learning and reciprocal 
accountability, we turn now to a detailed assessment of how some of these ideas are 
recognisable in Australia. Our focus is upon ongoing efforts to address Indigenous 
disadvantage, but a more detailed examination of place based learning-by-doing and 
empowering local communities in Australia is available in Wilks et al (2015). 
 
Indigenous Affairs in Australia  
The effort to build place-based capacity in Australia has perhaps received most emphasis in 
Indigenous affairs. In recent decades, Indigenous administration has evolved through distinct 
phases (including the Northern Territory Emergency Response – see AHRC 2007). The first 
involved Howard Coalition government (1996-2007) efforts to create joined-up regional 
services; the second involved Rudd Labor government (2007-2013) efforts to create common 
inter-governmental action around shared targets; and the third involved Abbott Coalition 
government (2013-2015) efforts to link Commonwealth funding to five priority themes. 
These varied efforts reflect some of the structural dilemmas impeding place-based 
approaches in Australia’s federal system, but also illustrate the building blocks needed for 
localised place-based practice with embedded learning and institutional reciprocity. 
 
 Phase 1: Structural Obstacles to Joined-up Government 
In terms of the policy development context, from 2002, the Howard government sought to 
decentralise the administration of Indigenous programmes and create a place-based practice. 
The Council of Australian Governments authorised trials of joined-up localised governance 
(COAG, 2004). In July 2004, thirty Indigenous Coordinating Centres (ICCs) were established 
to manage funding and liaison with communities. From early 2005, Shared Responsibility 
Agreements (SRA) and Regional Partnership Agreements (RPA) were signed. These were 
negotiated with communities. There have been numerous assessments of these reforms both 
official or commissioned evaluations and independent academic assessments: ANAO 2007; 
Gray 2006; Gray and Sanders 2006; Hunt 2007; KPMG 2007; Morgan Disney 2006; O’Flynn 
et al 2010; Urbis Keys Young 2006. 
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Although the conclusion is not always explicitly drawn, these reports all point to the 
structural barriers that impede whole-of-government service delivery   We focus briefly here 
on two, one commissioned (KPMG 2007) and the other independent, conducted by 
academics from the Australian National University and the University of Canberra (O’Flynn 
et al 2010). The KPMG study involved a review of internal documents plus interviews with 
158 Australian, state government agency staff and 35 community organisations.  The 
O’Flynn et al study was based on 48 field interviews covering staff at ICCs, State and 
regional offices and in Canberra. In summary, these reports identified the following 
impediments: 
1. Programmes remaining separate, with differential funding periods, delegations, 
reporting and other requirements. According to KPMG (2007): ‘Overwhelmingly the 
consultation repeated the message that the current funding and reporting arrangements 
are a significant barrier to whole-of-government collaboration…Line agencies have 
different program guidelines, funding rounds and delegation which do not 
align…Complaints were raised about the different risk assessments each line agency 
applies. In some cases this can result in applications undergoing up to 8 different risk 
assessments’ (pp. 32-34). 
O’Flynn et al. (2010) cite a Senior Executive Service officer at National Office: 
‘When you go from the top down to the bottom [whole-of-government] disconnects at 
multiple levels.  It disconnects through the allocation of finances, it disconnects 
through the rewards for your accountabilities for your program … so all those things 
work against it’ (p. 248). 
2. Probity requirements inhibiting the provision of advice: ‘Many line agency staff were 
unable to provide governance and financial management assistance to organisations 
due to probity issues relating to assessment of funding applications…’ (KPMG 2007 
p. 21) 
 
3. Regional managers lacking authority over assigned staff: ‘Line agencies confirmed 
that their staff are directly responsible to their line agency and that the ICC manager 
has no authority to compel or direct staff to undertake ICC work…. Conversely ICC 
managers reported feeling powerless in some situations as they do not have the 
authority to direct change’ (KPMG 2007 p. 9) 
O’Flynn et al’s (2010 p. 247) found the whole-of-government experiment to be an 
unequivocal failure because the ICCs under-performed due to the entrenched barriers to 
joined up working which permeate the broader public service. (For earlier discussions of such 
boundaries that resonate with these findings, see MAC 2004; Crowley 2004; and Hogg 
2000). 
 If we apply a place-based lens over these early developments, it is clear that the three 
necessary components of ‘localised context’, ‘embedded learning’ and ‘reciprocal 
accountability’ were only partially embraced.  Decisions on funding dates, outcomes 
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assessment processes, and the management of staff remained too centralised and disparate to 
translate to a truly localised context.  Equally, the sense of embedded learning through a 
dynamic two-way conversation and reporting system appears to have been swamped by 
accountability and reporting regimes that were too inflexible. This finding aligns with the 
broadly acknowledged sense in which traditional, typically hierarchical, working 
environments frustrate service delivery innovations that require heightened connectivity 
(Keast 2011; Ling 2002). 
 
Phase 2: Systemic Obstacles to Federal-State Collaboration and Continuous Improvement 
The next design iteration of Indigenous service delivery, under the Rudd government, sought 
to specify outcome challenges in concrete Closing the Gap terms and to tie state activity 
closely to these targets. But, as with its predecessor, this policy design was conceived at the 
centre and introduced top-down. In practice it undercut the flexibility that is required for 
effective local initiative and excluded engagement with the affected communities. It therefore 
implicitly makes the case for adopting more experimentalist practice that is provisional and 
corrigible, and subject to change as experience accumulates [Table 2]. 
In 2008, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed to six ambitious targets 
for Indigenous Australians: 
• Close the gap in life expectancy within a generation 
• Halve the gap in mortality rates for Indigenous children under five within a decade 
• Ensure all Indigenous four year olds in remote communities have access to early 
childhood education within five years 
• Halve the gap for Indigenous students in reading, writing and numeracy within a 
decade. 
• Halve the gap for Indigenous students in Year 12 attainment or equivalent attainment 
rates by 2020 
• Halve the gap in employment outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians within a decade. 
These were treated as definitive goals. Governments have since acted as though fully 
accountable for their achievement. However, the supporting notes to the various national 
agreements underlined their inherent uncertainty. For example, the gap in life expectancy was 
to be closed within 25 years. ‘This equates to an annual improvement in life expectancy of 
0.5 years for males and 0.4 years for females…Gains of this magnitude have taken around 60 
years to achieve in the Australian population as a whole’ (Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Federal Financial Relations, Schedule G:844).  
Jon Altman (2009) pointed to the problematic nature of employment outcomes. 
‘Research shows that between 1996 and 2006 less than 50 000 new jobs were created for 
																																								 																				
4 Available at: http://www.federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/content/intergovernmental_agreements.aspx. 
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Indigenous Australians. To halve the employment gap by 2016 will require between 71 000 
and 106 000 new jobs, an extremely ambitious target given that only about 140 000 
Indigenous people are currently employed. …The chance of finding mainstream employment 
in remote Australia is limited owing to geographic isolation’ (Ibid p.8). In the absence of 
employment, ‘closing gaps and ending disadvantage’ is a mischievous fiction (Ibid p. 6).  
Further evidence of the problematic nature of the basic goals is to be found in the 
Strategic Review of Indigenous Expenditure (DOF 2010) which notes: ‘Even by year 3 at 
school (average age 8), a very large gap has been established between the learning outcomes 
achieved by Indigenous and non-Indigenous students…The size of the gap varies widely by 
jurisdiction and location. It is widest in the Northern Territory in some remote schools no 
Indigenous students meet national minimum standards’ (Ibid p. 98). In relation to health, this 
report comments: ‘Clearly achieving the COAG targets for Indigenous life expectancy will be 
a major challenge with some commentators already labelling the target “aspirational”’ (Ibid p. 
132, citing Hoy, 2009).  
 Reflecting the highly centralised character of the goal-setting process, the Closing the 
Gaps targets became definitive for the elaborate performance management process that 
governed service delivery in the Indigenous policy system. Reviews by the COAG Reform 
Council, Productivity Commission, and annually to the Prime Minister documented slow 
progress against several goals and reverses in others (COA 2016). How did this centralised 
performance review contribute to on-the-ground adaptive learning or practice? McGuire and 
O’Neill (2013) found that the PC reporting had no influence:  ‘The target audience is the 
central and line agency managers responsible for budget preparation  ...….evidence of the 
influence on processes to improve service delivery is limited’.   
 Critiques of Indigenous service delivery do suggest that the top-down, centralised 
determination of targeted outcomes created a performance management regime almost 
wholly disconnected from practice and antithetical to place-based practice as we interpret it.  
Firstly, there was a lack of meaningful localised control, with the focus on headline policy 
targets providing a ‘one-size-fits all’ mindset.  And secondly, whilst the overreach in the 
targets set may be normatively laudable, in practice it undermined opportunities for either 
continuous learning or nuanced accountability, with the failure to reach targets becoming the 
dominant narrative at annual reporting time.  
 
Phase 3: Joined-up Funding 
In 2013, incoming conservative Prime Minister Abbott made Indigenous advancement a 
personal priority. As a consequence, a number of federal programmes were consolidated 
within the Prime Minister’s Department. To localise service delivery practices, a Network 
based on twelve regions was established. At the federal level, only health programmes 
remained outside the new arrangement. The government sponsored a report by a consortium 
of communities, which recommended devolution of funding and decision-making (Wunan 
2015). The Coalition government has yet to announce its response. Preliminary discussion 
underlines the scale of the challenge (e.g. Shergold 2006; 2013; Walker et al 2010; Chaney 
2013; Wunan 2015; Sullivan 2015).   
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Nevertheless, some building blocks for a more decentralised structure, as advocated 
here, with the features of localised context, embedded learning and locally interpreted 
accountability processes, would seem to be in place. For example, contracts oblige service 
providers to prepare activity plans describing their approach to delivery. Contracts envisage 
that providers will report routinely and in an informative way on progress. Local staff has the 
formal authority to initiate these exchanges. But the bottom-up processes through which such 
arrangements might be instituted remain to be developed. An accountability structure that can 
identify opportunities for adaptive learning and then disseminate this appropriately around 
the policy system is missing. Compliance checking dominates and it is not clear that the skills 
required to introduce a place-based approach are in place.  Crucially, the Indigenous policy 
coordination challenge, both across departments and levels of government, remains. In a 
review of processes in a comparable jurisdiction, Sabel and Jordan (2015) suggest how such 
matters might be addressed, but effective Australian arrangements appear to be a long way 
off.  
 
Delivering on the Promise of Place-Based Governance 
This paper has ranged broadly across the challenges of instituting place-based practice. It has 
suggested three design/assessment criteria for the development of a viable system.  It has 
described the well-documented range of approaches already introduced in a variety of 
settings in the UK, EU and the US. It has also explored the more recent move to place-based 
approaches in Indigenous service delivery in Australia, and it has questioned the capacity of 
this particular design to sufficiently institutionalise continuous improvement or learning. 
 In terms of the three research questions outlined at the beginning of this article, our 
examination suggests that the answers – like place-based approaches themselves – are highly 
contextual.  The conceptual work of Sabel and Simon, and the findings from existing 
approaches in the UK and the USA, suggest that there are clearly some necessary conditions 
for success.  As we suggest, localised context, embedded learning, and reciprocal 
accountability are all necessary components for place-based governance.  The challenge is to 
facilitate more innovative governance arrangements that allow sufficient local discretion 
without sacrificing the need to centrally account for money spent and outcomes achieved. 
 Our examination of the Whole-Place initiative in the UK, examples from the USA and 
Europe, and Indigenous policy in Australia has demonstrated that there is no single ‘best-
practice’ model of what a place-based solution looks like.  What works in UK communities 
will not necessarily transport across seamlessly into Australian Indigenous communities.  
Whilst the NAO (2013) assessment in the UK suggests that the approach is a sound one, the 
underwhelming outcomes of the last two decades in Australian Indigenous policy suggests 
that tailoring place-based strategies to local conditions needs to be even more finely-honed.   
The architect of the Australian approach to Indigenous services, Peter Shergold has 
called for a fresh design to address complex policy challenges: 
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A different type of public service (is required), not just an improved version of 
what already exists…….. I believe that Australia needs to rebuild and 
rearticulate the structures of democratic governance, recognizing that it 
requires greater collaboration between the public sector (on the one hand) and 
the private and community sectors (on the other). New forms of partnership 
are required to provide public benefit in unexpected ways and, in the process, 
to revitalize participatory engagement of citizens in the life of the nation. To 
achieve these goals the operation of public services (collectively) and the role 
of public servants (individually) will have to be transformed. So what are the 
elements of change that can together make over the world of public 
administration? (Shergold 2013b pp. 8-9). 
We argue that place-based governance has the potential to meet some of these challenges 
within the context of broader responses to the challenges of heightened connectivity in 
governance processes and service delivery. Drawing on Sabel’s work, we suggest that a focus 
on meeting the attributes of localised context, embedded learning and reciprocal 
accountability offers important advantages. First, it institutionalises collaboration by moving 
the focus away from what individual departments can deliver in favour of focusing on local 
need.  Second, it empowers individuals and local communities to view themselves as active 
participants in their own governance arrangements, rather than passive recipients of a policy 
solution based on a misguided centralised notion of ‘best-practice’. Third, it recognises that 
what constitutes policy ‘learning’ is always dependent on the local context, and that whilst 
‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions might help national governments measure outcomes, they do not 
help local communities address problems in nuanced ways. 
The conceptualisation of place-based governance as a constantly evolving, dynamic, 
and locally focused series of practices furthermore opens up important areas for academic 
research and practical program and policy improvement.  For example, as the evidence from 
other jurisdictions suggests, we still lack accountability systems that are sophisticated enough 
to allow for the level of local differentiation required.  Equally, the record of the Howard and 
Rudd administrations demonstrates that a national government, no matter how motivated by 
goodwill, cannot hope to implement place-based solutions simply by central decree. It 
requires on-the-ground collaboration across all levels of government, and further research is 
needed to draw out new options for how that sense of partnership might be able to manifest 
itself at the local level. We have begun that discussion here and have argued that Australia 
has a lot to learn, certainly from its own efforts and their evaluations, but also from 
theoretical and practical developments elsewhere. 
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